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Judging from the rhetoric of the dissenting Justices, the Supreme Court's
decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,' which upheld limits
on corporate campaign speech, marked a revolution in First Amendment
jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy branded the majority a "censor," and charac-
terized the result as "the most severe restriction on political speech ever
sanctioned by this Court. "2 Justice Scalia warned that by accepting the major-
ity's rationale, "the First Amendment will ultimately be brought down.' But
dissenters' rhetoric, like campaign speech itself, must be taken with a grain
of salt.
One might ask Justice Kennedy, for example, how a rule requiring corpora-
tions to establish a segregated fund of monies voluntarily donated for campaign
expenditures is a more "severe restriction on political speech" than the ten-year
prison sentence imposed on Socialist Party leader Eugene Debs for an anti-war
speech, upheld by the Supreme Court in Debs v. United States.4 And Justice
Scalia's apocalyptic pronouncement comes at least four years too late, as
Austin did no more than apply the rationale set forth in Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL),' a decision which
Justice Scalia himselfjoined. Moreover, in holding that corporations' campaign
expenditures can be restricted, the Austin decision essentially ratified what
Congress has been doing since 1947, when it amended the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act to prohibit corporate expenditures in connection with federal
electoral campaigns.
In fact, Austin was a remarkable decision, but not for the reasons stated
by the dissent. Far from marking the beginning of the end of the First Amend-
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1. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
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3. Id. at 1411.
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ment, Austin, and MCFL before it, reflect the Court's first serious acknowl-
edgments of the structural problem underlying the campaign spending issue:
capitalism and democracy are an uneasy mix. Free market capitalism threatens
the free marketplace of ideas by giving certain voices inordinate influence, not
because of the power of their ideas, but because of the volume they can
generate for their voices with dollars earned through commercial activities.
Because even "free speech" costs money, those who succeed in the economic
marketplace are able to purchase far more speech opportunities than those who
do not. Absent government intervention of some kind, the marketplace of
ideas, and in turn the election of our representatives, threatens to go to the
highest bidder. The threat posed by concentrated wealth is not merely the
aberration of a bribed official, but the structural threat of a monopolized
marketplace of ideas.
This fact, long recognized by politicians and those who study them,6 has
generally been ignored by the Court. Until MCFL and Austin, the Court treated
the distorting effects of wealth on electoral debate as a phenomenon beyond
legitimate government control. As the Court stated in Buckley v. Valeo, "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment. "' From this perspective, the only legitimate interest served
by campaign finance regulation was avoidance of the most mundane form of
corruption, namely, direct exchange of money for votes. In Austin, the Court
for the first time upheld campaign finance regulations as a justified response
to a far more problematic and systemic form of corruption: "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas."8 With these words, the
Court has begun to acknowledge the problem that capitalism poses for democ-
racy. It has also potentially begun a new era of campaign finance jurispru-
dence, for the Court's recognition of systemic corruption collapses all the
distinctions that guided its prior jurisprudence in this area.
Whether Austin gets us much closer to solving the problem it recognizes
6. David Magleby and Candice Nelson, in a recent overview of the literature on the effects of money
on electoral success, concluded that "while disagreement continues about the relative importance of money
to challengers and incumbents, the conclusion of all is that money matters in congressional elections."
DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM 69-70 (1990); see also ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUP-
TION 77-98 (1983) (arguing that money can make a difference in who wins elections, and in who has access
to politicians); cf GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980) (maintaining that
money is more important for challengers than incumbents); Charles R. Beitz, Political Finance in the United
States: A Survey of Research, 95 ETHICS 129, 138-41 (1984) (finding that money matters, but is only one
of several important campaign resources).
7. 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
8. 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
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is another matter. The Austin dissents unwittingly demonstrate the intractability
of the problem. If government may limit corporate political speech because
of its inordinate power, the dissenters ask, why could it not also restrict the
speech of the media, certainly the most influential corporations in the market-
place of ideas today? Moreover, capitalism does not make only businesses inor-
dinately wealthy. The individuals who own, manage, or invest in corporations
(or whose parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents did so) gain similar
advantages, which are equally unrelated to "the public's support for the
[individuals'] political ideas." 9 And the state's legal protection of private
property maintains and reinforces such inequalities. Thus, the problem of
inequitable wealth distribution and its effect on the electoral marketplace
extends far beyond corporations. The Austin dissenters are correct that the line
drawn at corporations is artificial, but that observation does not tell us whether
we should be less or more concerned with redressing the distorting effects of
wealth.
Aggregations of wealth, corporate or otherwise, pose a direct threat to the
principles of representative democracy. Non-media corporate wealth, the
specific focus of the law upheld in Austin, is merely the easiest form of wealth
distortion to address. With a corporation, it is possible to create an admittedly
rough distinction between the influence derived from an idea and the influence
derived from a speaker's wealth. But the problems that the Court recognized
in Austin go much deeper, and pose a fundamental value choice for the Court,
Congress, and the American people: how are we to reconcile the egalitarian
aspiration reflected in the First Amendment, in the right to vote, and in the
democratic ideal, with the anti-egalitarian foundation of capitalism? This article
will trace the Supreme Court's ambivalent approach to this question, and will
argue that while Austin does not answer the question, it takes an important first
step simply by recognizing that the problem exists.
Part I will sketch the general jurisprudential outlines of the Court's ap-
proach to campaign finance regulation prior to Austin. The Court's pre-Austin
approach was premised on two metaphors that obfuscated the structural threat
posed by the use of concentrated wealth: a laissez-faire model of "free trade
in ideas" and "quid pro quo" corruption. As a result, most of the Court's
campaign spending decisions have an air of unreality and are founded on
distinctions-between contributions and expenditures, referenda and candidate
elections-that cannot be sustained in light of Austin.
Part II will focus specifically on the Court's treatment of campaign spend-
ing by corporations. In this line of cases, culminating in Austin, the Court
ultimately moved beyond the metaphors that plagued its general approach, and




Court recognized the structural nature of the problem that concentrated wealth
poses for freedom of speech, and properly upheld limited government interven-
tion designed to correct the distorting effects of corporate wealth. While this
development was easiest in the corporate context, dissenting Justices Scalia and
Kennedy are correct that it cannot be analytically confined to that context, and
accordingly it may presage a new approach to campaign finance generally.
Finally, inspired by the Austin dissenters' insight, part III will argue that
the wealth distortion problem is not only not unique to corporations, but is also
not unique to campaign spending. In fact, it is endemic to democratic capital-
ism, which at once guarantees rights of equality and rights of inequality. The
conflict between a norm of equality, reflected in the campaign finance context
in the right to vote and the right to free speech, and the reality of inequality,
is one the Court has repeatedly confronted in other constitutional areas. What
is most striking about Austin is that its approach goes against the grain of much
of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence concerning this fundamental conflict.
The Austin Court recognizes what most of the Court's previous decisions
pointedly ignored: the threat economic inequality poses for realizing
individuals' constitutional rights.
I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE: CAPTURED BY METAPHOR
A. The Metaphor of the Political Marketplace
At one point in his Austin dissent, an extended lament to what he apparent-
ly sees as a fast-disappearing First Amendment, Justice Scalia remarked, "[ilt
is sad to think that the First Amendment will ultimately be brought down not
by brute force but by poetic metaphor."10 The "poetic metaphor" to which
Justice Scalia refers is "corruption." While corruption seems at first glance
neither poetic nor metaphorical, Justice Scalia suggested that the Austin
majority had made it so by extending it well beyond its original meaning.
Where "corruption" in previous cases referred only to direct, quid pro quo
exchanges of money for votes, the majority in Austin used it to describe the
systemic distorting effects of wealth on the public dialogue. Adopting a
somewhat poetic technique himself, Justice Scalia labeled the majority's view
of corruption the "New Corruption.""
Justice Scalia's poetic critique is curious, for no constitutional doctrine is
more centrally founded on poetic metaphor than First Amendment doctrine.
The "free marketplace of ideas," the governing principle of First Amendment
jurisprudence, is nothing more than a metaphor. There is no New York Stock
10. 110 S. Ct. at 1411.
11. Id. at 1414.
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Exchange for speech, yet the notion of "free trade" in ideas has nonetheless
guided the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence since Justice Holmes first
used the image in his 1919 dissent in Abrams v. United States. 2 In fact,
Justice Scalia's dissent in Austin itself draws on one version of this metaphor-
the laissez-faire model, in which government regulation is inherently suspect,
and a "free market" is defined by the absence of government intervention. I
will argue that it is precisely the Court's pure laissez-faire approach to First
Amendment issues, an approach abandoned long ago in the economic market-
place, that has so stymied judicial response to the campaign finance issue.'3
Laissez-faire, however, is not the only lens through which to view the
"marketplace of ideas." The Austin majority also hews to the marketplace
metaphor, but its model envisions a more interventionist role for government.
In its view, a wholly unregulated marketplace of ideas does not necessarily
produce the most "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 4 debate, just as an
unregulated economic marketplace does not necessarily result in the most
competitive free trade. The Austin majority recognizes that concentrations of
wealth can distort the speech market, and that government regulation may be
needed to offset the distorting effects of that inequality. Thus, far from reject-
ing the "marketplace" metaphor, the Austin Court adapts it to take into account
the reality of unequal wealth.
The "marketplace" metaphor can be traced back well before Holmes to
John Milton (when it was more truly poetic) and John Stuart Mill, both of
whom maintained that "Truth" was best approached by the free struggle of
ideas. ' That notion has been sharply criticized on both theoretical and practical
grounds. 6 As a matter of theory, critics argue, there appears to be no reason
why "truth" should win in a hypothetical free market. In free competition,
12. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Elsewhere I have traced the poetic/juridical development of this
metaphor. See David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95
YALE L.J. 857 (1986).
13. This laissez-faire approach is not limited to the First Amendment. Constitutional jurisprudence
is generally far more concerned with government intervention than with the effects of nonintervention. The
Constitution is understood to provide negative rights against government interference, not affirmative
entitlements to government assistance for those whose means foreclose them from exercising their
constitutional rights. The effect of the Court's libertarian, negative view of rights is that only those wealthy
enough to exercise their rights are in fact "free" to do so. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977) (state may choose to fund childbirth and not abortion, notwithstanding pressure this policy exerts
on indigent women not to have abortion); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (same); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (equal protection not violated by state's district-
based public school funding system that results in substantial disparities in resources for rich and poor
school districts).
14. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
15. See John Milton, Areopagitica, reprinted in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM 28 (Milton Mayer ed.,
1957) ("Let [Truth] and Falshood [sic] grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open
encounter"); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 38 (R. B. McCallum ed., 1949). See generally Cole, supra
note 12, at 875-78.
16. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6-24 (1989).
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people might well be persuaded by falsehood.17 If we could accurately define
truth, therefore, there would be little point in allowing falsehoods free rein.
Thus, the argument for "free trade" necessarily turns on human uncertainty-it
is because we cannot know truth that we must allow a free exchange of ideas.
But if we cannot know what is true, then how can we know whether it is true
that "free trade" will get us there? As Justice Holmes himself acknowledged,
belief in "free trade" ultimately requires a leap of faith: the Constitution "is
an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowl-
edge. " 8
The "marketplace of ideas" is by no means the only rationale for the First
Amendment. Some scholars have suggested that the First Amendment should
be viewed in more individualistic terms, as a means of protecting liberty, 9
self-realization,2" or autonomy.2" Still others have argued that the value of
speech lies not in its discovery of truth but in its integral role in self-govern-
ment.' But as Justices Brandeis and Brennan's best opinions have demon-
strated, these values are not inconsistent with the "marketplace of ideas. " '
It is in part by protecting the liberty and autonomy of speakers that we encour-
age the free exchange of ideas necessary to informed collective decisions about
what course is best for our society. Similarly, we further liberty and autonomy
values by promoting the free exchange of ideas.
The particular value of the marketplace metaphor is that it depicts free
speech as both an individual and a collective right. Its emphasis on the collec-
tive or structural perspective can be found in its goal of an "uninhibited, robust
and wide-open" debate on public issues.24 The First Amendment's vision of
a robust marketplace of ideas dovetails with the republican conception of the
town meeting, and implies not merely an abstract or formal "right" to speak,
but a more substantive guarantee that ordinary people will in fact have a real
opportunity to participate in the exchange.' If a laissez-faire approach does
not produce such a debate, the "marketplace" approach may justify affirmative
17. Id. at 12-16.
18. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. BAKER, supra note 16, at 5.
20. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
21. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
22. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
(Greenwood Press 1979) (1948).
23. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); CBS
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 170-204 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
the relationship of these opinions to the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor, see Cole, supra note 12, at 887-
92, 897-902.
24. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
25. See, e.g., CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 183-204 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (relying on "marketplace
of ideas" metaphor to find First Amendment right of access for editorial advertisers to television stations);
see also Cole, supra note 12, at 894, 897-900 (discussing implications of Justice Brennan's "marketplace"
metaphor).
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government intervention.
Moreover, the "marketplace" model, while widely criticized in the academ-
ic community, remains a dominant point of reference in First Amendment
jurisprudence and ideology.26 This may be because the leap of faith it requires
is precisely the same leap of faith that liberalism itself makes: a belief in
reason. It is reason that does the work in the marketplace of ideas, distilling
good from bad, truth from error, and the just from the unjust. Stanley Fish
has persuasively argued that while liberalism often sees faith and reason as
polar opposites, reason is ultimately liberalism's faith; reason is the standard
by which outcomes are judged in a liberal system, and as such, reason itself
cannot be questioned within the domain of liberalism. 27 Like liberalism, the
marketplace of ideas also rests on faith in the capacity for reason. The market-
place's strength as a metaphor, then, is that it captures a central tenet of our
political faith.
B. The Economics of the Political Marketplace
The weakness of the "marketplace" story is its susceptibility to laissez-faire
interpretation, which is in turn subject to a devastating practical critique. As
Owen Fiss has cogently argued, the "marketplace" image of streetcorner
speakers competing for audience approval in the town square, whether or not
it was ever accurate, simply does not reflect the reality of speech in the era
of mass communications.2" Today's streetcorner is a television set,29 and
a handful of speakers control access to the podium. Access is theoretically
available, but only at a prohibitive price,30 and certainly not for all.3" In
today's marketplace, therefore, the most effective opportunities to address the
public are limited to those with substantial economic resources. That these
developments have affected political campaigns is indisputable; the press
regularly reports on the long hours politicians feel compelled to devote to
raising money for their campaigns, the costs of which skyrocket further every
26. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418-420 (1989); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 270.
27. Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DuKE L.J. 997; see also Stephen L. Carter,
Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977.
28. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408-25 (1986).
29. See e.g., CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 195 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30. The amount of money spent on all political television advertising during election years increased,
in constant 1988 dollars, from under $50 million in 1970 to over $225 million in 1988. American Politics
Loses Way as Polls Displace Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, at A22. Advertising and media costs
make up between 15% and 70% of federal electoral candidates' spending. MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra
note 6, at 61-62. In the 1986 campaign, congressional candidates spent more than $97 million on broadcast-
ing alone. Id.
31. With few exceptions, broadcasters have no obligation to accept paid political advertisements. See
CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (upholding against a First Amendment challenge broadcasters' refusal
to accept paid political advertisements). But cf. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding FCC




These economic barriers to the marketplace of ideas threaten the norm of
equality implicit in the marketplace metaphor and the First Amendment itself.
The metaphor is premised on the notion that individuals and ideas will have
equal access to the market, so that the exchange will be robust and wide-open,
and so the audience can choose the best ideas. The First Amendment therefore
prohibits the government from picking and choosing among ideas or speakers
based on the content of their speech or their identity.33 By forbidding such
discrimination, the First Amendment creates a kind of equal protection guaran-
tee for speakers and ideas. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]here is an
'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and government must afford all points
of view an opportunity to be heard. "34 That "equality of status" is threatened
if vast concentrations of wealth can effectively dominate the "marketplace. "
31
These problems are especially grave in the campaign context for a number
of reasons. First, the stakes are arguably higher here than in other realms of
speech. Elections are the backbone of our democratic system, so threats to
their integrity strike directly at the legitimacy of the whole system. And speech
plays perhaps its most crucial societal role in the electoral process by inform-
ing citizens of candidates' views, and by defining the issues that determine how
we vote. For this reason, the Court has long maintained that political speech,
and especially speech during political campaigns, is at the apex of First
Amendment protection.36
Second, the norm of equality implicit in the First Amendment's mandate
is heightened in the electoral context by the guarantee of "one person, one
32. An Edge for Incumbents: Loopholes That Pay Off, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990, at A16; Study
Links Contributions to How Lawmakers Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1987, at A10; DREW, supra note 6,
at 1; MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 6, at 43-44.
33. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978) ("In the realm of protected
speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may
speak and the speakers who may address a public issue.").
34. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (quoting ALEXANDER MEIK-EJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)); see also Kenneth L.
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CI. L. REV. 20 (1975).
35. See Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to
Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273 (1983) (arguing that Court
should respond to this threat by according absolute protection only to those forms of speech to which all
citizens have access, while balancing the effects on collective rights when treating regulation of speech
activities not accessible to all).
36. Bellotti. 435 U.S. at 776-77 (speech during political campaigns is "at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection" because "it is indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy"); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (campaign expenditures constitute "political expression 'at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.'") (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
32 (1968); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. Indeed, one of the principal
rationales for protecting speech in the first place is its integral relationship to the means by which a polity
decides how to govern itself. See generally, ALEXANDER MEIKLEIOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948).
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vote." 37 When unequal monetary resources translate into unequal influence
in electoral campaigns, the democratic function of the "one person, one vote"
guarantee is undermined. That guarantee is designed to ensure that we all have
an equal say in the composition of our government, but the mere fact that we
all have one vote at the end of the campaign does not negate the substantial
effects of widespread spending differentials during the campaign.
Political participation in the form of expenditures or donations is apparently
for most citizens a luxury, to be engaged in only after the necessities of life-
food, housing, clothing-are obtained. Campaign expenditures are made by
a small minority of the population-approximately fourteen percent, excluding
the one dollar check-off on federal income tax returns. 38 Not surprisingly,
that small minority is concentrated in the upper- and middle-income brack-
ets. 39 Thus, unless political participation is in some measure equalized, the
"one person, one vote" guarantee is in danger of being reduced to a formalistic
symbol.
Finally, electoral campaigns are of finite duration. The marketplace model
is premised on the ongoing exchange of ideas, and cannot guarantee that the
best result will prevail at any particular moment. Because the campaign
exchange is cut short on election day, there may be a greater danger of
distortion from well-timed infusions of wealth that produce effectively unan-
swerable speech.'
On the one hand, these concerns might support an argument that the First
Amendment should require government regulation of campaign finance. After
all, where wealth directly threatens to undermine the representative process,
such as where votes are bought and sold, we criminalize the activity, reflecting
a strong social consensus that such distortions of democracy cannot be counte-
nanced. It does not require a great leap, then, to maintain that First Amend-
ment and democratic values similarly require the government to take some
responsibility for counteracting distortions of wealth in the electoral speech
marketplace.
37. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964). As Alexander Heard wrote:
A deeply cherished slogan of American democracy is "one man-one vote." . . . Concern over
the private financing of political campaigns stems in significant measure from the belief that a
gift is an especially important kind of vote. It is grounded in the thought that persons who give
in larger sums or to more candidates than their fellow citizens are in effect voting more than
once.
ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 48-49 (1960).
38. Beitz, supra note 6, at 132-33.
39. Id.
40. Paul G. Chevigny, The Paradox of Campaign Finance, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 206, 214 (1981) (book
review) (citing INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARV. U., AN
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT, 1972-78, at 3-37 (1979)). DREw,
supra note 6, at 80 (organizations prefer to contribute and spend in the last few days of campaigns).
Vol. 9:236, 1991
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On the other hand, the campaign context also presents special reasons for
fearing government regulation of speech. The Court's recognition of the
importance of protecting political speech stems at least in part from a sense
that public officials will be most tempted to censor political speech precisely
because it hits closest to home.4 t Where speech directly involves a political
campaign that will determine whether those in power remain there, the tempta-
tion to suppress is likely to be even greater. A frequent criticism of campaign
spending ceilings, moreover, is that they favor incumbents, because challengers
generally need more money to overcome the advantages of incumbency. These
concerns, considered on their own, might lead one to conclude that the First
Amendment should forbid government regulation of campaign finance.
The threats to free and equitable participation in campaign debate are thus
bipolar: one pole appears to demand government intervention and the other
appears to prohibit intervention. Both private concentrations of wealth and
government authority can be abused to undermine free and equitable access
to the political process. For this reason, campaign finance issues present a
classic Scylla and Charybdis scenario: in order to respond to the danger of
private monopolization, we must empower government, the other pole of the
peril.
C. The Jurisprudence of the Political Marketplace
The Supreme Court has not navigated this course particularly well in the
twenty or so years that it has been actively reviewing campaign finance laws.
Until MCFL and Austin, the Court was hampered by metaphorical blinders.
Captured by the laissez-faire model of the marketplace and a quid pro quo
vision of corruption, the Court could not see the structural basis of the
problem-the systemic distortion created by an inequitable distribution of
wealth. As a result, its campaign finance jurisprudence was constructed on a
series of distinctions that made little or no sense, and were doomed to collapse.
1. The vision of quid pro quo corruption: Legitimizing laissez-faire. The
Supreme Court's modern-day approach to campaign finance was forged in
Buckley v. Valeo,42 which presented a facial challenge to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). FECA established ceilings on contributions
41. "Freedom of expression has particular significance with respect to government because '[ilt is here
that the state has a special incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective power of
suppression.'" First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n. 11 (1978) (quoting THOMAS
IRWIN EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (1966)).
42. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
43. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
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to political candidates," independent expenditures related to candidates,45
and expenditures by the candidates themselves.' The Court first held that any
restriction on campaign spending must be subjected to strict scrutiny, because
a limitation on the amount of money one can spend or contribute for a political
cause is essentially a restriction on political speech.47 This equation of money
with speech has been much criticized," but it cannot be denied that a restric-
tion on the amount of money one can spend in furtherance of a particular idea,
cause, or candidate is a restriction on one's freedom of speech. Restrictions
on campaign spending cannot be treated as mere limits on conduct, as Judge
Skelly Wright proposed,49 because the government's purpose in setting such
constraints is to limit the amount of political speech that those with substantial
resources can purchase. 0 Moreover, Sanford Levinson has argued that cam-
paign spending limits cannot be characterized as content-neutral, because if
political ideas and causes were randomly distributed across the economic
spectrum, we would not be concerned about regulating campaign finance in
the first place."'
44. The Act limited contributions made by individuals and groups to $1,000 to any candidate per
election, with an overall annual limit on individual contributions of $25,000. 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(b)(1), (3)
(1970 ed. Supp. IV). It also limited contributions by political action committees to $5,000 to any candidate
per election. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2).
45. The Act limited independent expenditures to a candidate to $1,000 per election. 18 U.S.C. §
608(e).
46. The Act set different limits for expenditures by the candidates and their families, depending on
the office for which they were running. A candidate for President or Vice-President could spend up to
$50,000 of his or her own money, a Senatorial candidate could spend up to$35,000, and a candidate for
the House of Representatives was limited to $25,000. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a).
47. 424 U.S. at 14-15, 25, 44-45.
48. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976); see also Blum, supra note 35, at 1369-82 (arguing that campaign expenditures do not deserve
absolute First Amendment protection, because they have the effect of perpetuating political domination by
economic elites).
49. Wright, supra note 48, at 1006.
50. Where the government's purpose in proscribing expressive conduct is related to expression, the
proscription must be treated as if it were a prohibition on speech itself, and subjected to strict scrutiny.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988), where the
Court held that any act proscribing expressive conduct must be subjected to "the most exacting scrutiny.");
see also United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1990) (also citing Boos).
51. Sanford Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New Road to Contradiction?, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 939 (1985) (reviewing ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY (1983)). Levinson notes that
we are not concerned with regulating celebrities' use of their fame to support political candidates, or
students' use of volunteer time, presumably because we believe that celebrities' and students' views are
randomly distributed politically. Id. at 949. By contrast, he suggests, our interest in restricting the rights
of the rich to use their advantages implies that we believe the rich are identifiably different from the rest
of us in their political ideology. Id. at 945.
But arguably our special concern about wealth distortion reflects not a desire to suppress the point
of view of the wealthy, but an attempt to counteract systemic distortion of the political process, whatever
views the wealthy may have. In this respect, campaign finance restrictions might be analogous to time,
place, and manner restrictions on the quantity or volume of speech, as in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (upholding power to regulate use of amplifiers) or Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781
(1989) (same). Campaign spending regulations are like a rule forbidding participants in a town meeting
from bringing individual amplifiers to drown out their fellow citizens. Such a rule seems both wise and
fair, whether or not those who could afford the amplifiers share a particular political ideology.
First Amendment Antitrust
The Court's recognition that regulation of spending in political campaigns
directly implicates speech concerns is therefore not the Buckley decision's weak
link. Its mistake, rather, was to proceed from the conclusion that spending
limits restrict the speech of the spender to the assumption that the spender's
speech rights are the only rights at stake. In weighing the intrusion on
spender's speech rights against the asserted state interests, the Court rejected
out-of-hand the statute's most important justification: the need to limit distor-
tions in the marketplace caused by concentrations of wealth.
Even assuming that our concern with vast expenditures in political cam-
paigns arises from a sense that the wealthy hold a particular point of view, one
can still maintain that regulation is justified as an attempt to offset distortion
in the political process. Wealth poses a unique threat of systemic distortion in
part because one of the most important issues the state addresses is the distri-
bution of wealth itself. If those who hold favored positions in the existing
distribution of wealth are allowed to use their inequitable distributions to
maintain the status quo against majority desires, the legitimacy of the demo-
cratic process is directly undermined. 2
The Court flatly refuted such redistributional rationales, stating, "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment . . . . "' But this concept is by no means "wholly foreign"
to the First Amendment. In fact, seven years earlier in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC,54 the Court upheld the fairness doctrine on the ground that the
government could restrict the speech of some elements of our society-
broadcasters-in order to enhance the relative voice of others-viewers and
listeners. It would later uphold an FCC regulation requiring broadcasters to
provide reasonable access to such candidates during electoral campaigns, again
permitting the government to restrict the speech rights of broadcasters in the
interest of enhancing the relative voice of others, candidates for federal of-
52. This concern is strengthened by the fact that even without the influence that unregulated campaign
spending would provide, the business community holds a privileged position vis-4-vis the state that already
affords it a disproportionate say over political decisions. As Charles Lindblom has detailed in Politics and
Markets, in a capitalist system the state, by and large, lets private business decide many important social
policy decisions: wage scales, production schedules, plant location, and the quality and quantity of goods
and services. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITIcs AND MARKETS 170-72 (1977). The government has a
strong interest in appeasing business because it depends on business to make and implement these important
decisions, and accordingly the government involves business very closely in its decision making processes.
Id. at 172-79. Thus, business already has a tremendous ability, even outside the electoral channels, to make
demands on the state independent of, and often contrary to, democratic controls. Id. at 190. Lindblom
accordingly sees the corporation as the primary impediment to a truly democratic state. Id. at 356. Given
these concerns, there is every reason to believe both that the wealthy business class has a particular
ideology, id. at 193-200, and that we are justified in restricting its use of campaign spending as a means
toward further domination. See generally, id. at 123.
53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
54. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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fice." The Court has traditionally distinguished the broadcast setting on the
ground that the government is responsible for the inequity in speech opportuni-
ties, since it assigns exclusive rights to the airwaves.56 However, it can be
argued that the government is similarly responsible for the inequity in capital,
for its laws provide the means for capital formation and protection for the
property that is thereby accumulated.57
Nor is the concept that the government may seek to enhance certain
speakers' rights at the expense of others limited to the broadcast medium. In
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,5 the Court effectively permitted state
governments to restrict the speech rights of shopping mall owners by requiring
them to provide access to their property for speakers with whom they dis-
agree.5 9 It had previously held that the First Amendment required such access
in certain situations .6' Despite subsequent cases that cut back on that hold-
ing,6 ' the Court in Pruneyard still recognized that the government may seek
to ensure speech opportunities for those without substantial resources by
reasonable intrusions on the rights of property owners.
In Buckley, however, the Court was unwilling to ratify such a redistribu-
tional objective. It held that the only legitimate rationale for restricting cam-
paign spending was to avoid both the reality and the appearance of corruption.
The Buckley Court's image of corruption was limited to the direct, quid pro
55. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
56. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-90. The Red Lion Court is generally understood to have treated
broadcasters differently on the ground that the airwaves are a scarce resource. Id. at 390. However, all
resources are scarce, so either this argument justifies similar regulation of all forms of speech, or it does
not justify regulation with respect to broadcasting only. See R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14-19 (1959). The Court in Red Lion addressed this criticism at the close
of its opinion, and reasoned that even if scarcity itself is not a sufficient justification, the fact that the
government is responsible for the favored position of current broadcasters justifies the regulation. 395 U.S.
at 400.
57. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927) (established property
rules concentrate sovereign power among those who control business and finance); Robert L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Scl. Q. 470 (1923) (coercive
arrangements, as altered by governmental bodies, channel wealth).
58. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
59. The Court in Pruneyard technically found that a state constitutional provision that mandated access
for speech purposes to a shopping mall did not infringe the owner's First Amendment rights, 447 U.S.
at 85-88, and thus did not reach the question whether the mall owner's rights could be infringed for the
sake of providing access to others. However, the Court's reasoning on this point cannot be squared with
several other cases in which it found mandated access requirements to violate the right not to support the
speech of others. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (invalidating
requirement that consumer group have access to utility billing envelopes four times a year, on ground that
it would violate utility's right not to support speech of consumer group); Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down right of reply statute in part because it would infringe on newspaper's
right not to publish what it does not want to publish).
60. See e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (mere
fact of private ownership in shopping center proprietors does not justify absolute injunction against
nonemployee picketing of store in center); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (state cannot criminally
punish individual who is distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of a company-owned town).
61. Lloyd Corp. Ltd., v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (distinguishing and restricting holding of Logan
Valley); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (holding that Lloyd Corp. had overruled Logan Valley).
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quo exchange of money for votes. This is corruption with a lower case "c,"
as distinct from the "New Corruption" of Austin, which acknowledged the
systemic corrupting distortion that unequal resources can cause in the electoral
marketplace. The corruption recognized in Buckley occurs on the individual
level, and is seen as an aberration. As an aberration, it implicitly affirms the
legitimacy of the system; where we can avoid the reality and appearance of
quid pro quo corruption, it suggests, the representative process works. For the
same reason, the Court's narrow view of quid pro quo corruption is congruous
with a laissez-faire approach to the marketplace of ideas-it presumes that the
marketplace will function with only minimal government intervention. Thus,
the Buckley Court recognized the form of corruption that legitimizes the back-
ground norm, while refusing to acknowledge a form of corruption that chal-
lenges the system itself. This choice to ignore the much more serious problem
doomed the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence to incoherence.
2. The legacy of quid pro quo: Incoherent distinctions. The incoherence
began in Buckley itself, as the Court drew an untenable distinction between
contributions and expenditures. To contribute money to a candidate, the Court
reasoned, is to speak indirectly through another, while independently expending
money on speech in favor of a candidate is a direct speech act, more worthy
of First Amendment protection.62 Conversely, contributions pose a greater
threat of corruption because they are more valuable to the candidate than
independent expenditures, which are not subject to the candidate's control.63
Accordingly, since contributions are both less valuable speech and more invit-
ing of corruption than independent expenditures, the Court upheld all the
restrictions on contributions while invalidating all the limits on independent
expenditures.
Both premises of the contribution-expenditure distinction can be attacked.
From the speech-value perspective, it is by no means clear that it is of greater
expressive value to pay an advertising firm to produce a commercial supporting
a particular candidate, an independent expenditure under FECA, than to pay
the candidate to have her staff produce the same commercial, a contribution
under FECA. Nor is it evident, even from a narrow quid pro quo corruption
perspective, why a candidate will not be just as beholden to the supporter who
spends $1,000,000 to purchase advertising time advocating her election as to
the supporter who contributes $1,000,000 directly to the candidate.' Partic-
ularly once the latter option is precluded, it seems that if the candidate is to
be beholden to anyone, it will be to the supporters who spend the most money
62. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
63. Id. at 47.
64. DREW, supra note 6, at 134-45 (detailing ways in which "independent" expenditures function like
contributions).
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on her behalf. 61 Moreover, once corruption is recognized to include the
distorting effects of concentrated wealth on electoral debate, this prong of the
contribution-expenditure distinction collapses entirely.
Given its shaky foundations, the contribution-expenditure distinction was
destined to fall. And fall it did, with the premise that contributions have less
expressive value than expenditures being the first to go. Its analytical infirmity
became apparent in California Medical Association v. Federal Election Com-
mission.66 In that case, the Court upheld a $5,000 limit on contributions by
individuals and groups to political action committees (PACs). California
Medical Association argued forcefully that this limit on contributions was
indistinguishable from a limit on expenditures, because its members had simply
chosen to exercise their associational rights by pooling their money with others
rather than spending it independently. A 4-member plurality rejected that
argument, relying on Buckley for the proposition that contributions are less
protected because they constitute "speech by proxy" rather than direct
speech. 67 However, Justice Blackmun, the fifth and deciding vote, agreed
with California Medical Association that contributions and expenditures could
not be distinguished from the vantage point of First Amendment values. 68 He
was willing to go along with the distinction only because of its second premise,
namely that contributions have greater potential for corruption.69
The "speech by proxy" argument was dealt its fatal blows in Citizens
Against Rent Control v. Berkeley7 and Federal Election Commission v. Na-
tional Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPA C).7 Its undoing was
the right of association. The decision to contribute to an organization, a party,
or a candidate is a decision to associate, Chief Justice Burger explained for
the Court in Citizens Against Rent Control.72 Contributions are a form of
"collective expression," no less deserving of First Amendment protection than
independent expenditures." The Court in Citizens Against Rent Control,
therefore, held unconstitutional a limit on contributions to organizations for
the purpose of speaking on referendum issues.
Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Court in NCPAC, put the all-but-
final touches on the contribution-expenditure distinction's demise, even as he
sought to retain it in name. At issue was the FEC's restriction on independent
expenditures by PACs in support of candidates receiving public financing.
65. Id.
66. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
67. Id. at 196.
68. Id. at 202.
69. Id. at 203.
70. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
71. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
72. 454 U.S. at 295-96; see also NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493-95.
73. 454 U.S. at 295-96.
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Pointing to California Medical Association, the FEC argued that PAC expendi-
tures deserve less First Amendment protection because they are nothing more
than the PAC contributors' "speech by proxy."" Justice Rehnquist refused
to apply a lower level of scrutiny, arguing, as Chief Justice Burger had before
him, that PAC expenditures reflect the pooling of resources for the purpose
of amplifying the contributors' speech.7" Once contributions are seen as a
means for people to associate in order to amplify their voices, it makes no
sense to accord them less First Amendment protection than expenditures.
Justice Rehnquist nonetheless held onto the corruption premise of the distinc-
tion, maintaining that contributions to candidates pose a threat of corruption
that contributions to PACs and other organizations do not.76
Thus, by the time the Court decided NCPAC, the first premise of the
contribution-expenditure distinction had been effectively discredited. The only
remaining basis for the distinction was the supposedly greater potential for
corruption posed by contributions. This is a thin reed for treating contributions
and expenditures differently, as it has never received empirical support, and
seems contrary to most anecdotal evidence.77 But more importantly, its validi-
ty depends on a narrow view of corruption. If corruption is understood more
broadly to encompass the systemic distorting effects of wealth, there is no basis
even in theory for distinguishing between contributions and expenditures. As
I explain in part II, Austin's "New Corruption" drove the final nail into the
coffin of the contribution-expenditure distinction.
A second distinction that guided the Court's approach to campaign finance
issues, and which is similarly premised on the Court's narrow view of quid
pro quo corruption, is that between candidate elections and referenda. Refer-
enda are not subject to quid pro quo corruption because there are no candidates
to bribe. "Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The
risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections simply is
not present in a popular vote on a public issue. " Accordingly, the Court has
74. The FEC's argument in NCPAC was the flipside of California Medical Association's in California
Medical Association. California Medical Association sought to have a limit on contributions treated as a
limit on expenditures, while the FEC asked the Court to treat a limit on expenditures as a limit on
contributions. In both cases, the Court rejected the invitations. In NCPAC, however, the Court's justification
for maintaining the distinction only underscores the fundamental equivalence of contributions and expendi-
tures.
75. 470 U.S. at 493-95. As Justice Rehnquist wrote: "To say that [PAC contributors'] collective action
in pooling their resources to amplify their voices is not entitled to full First Amendment protection would
subordinate the voices of those of modest means as opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy
expensive media ads with their own resources." Id. at 495. Ironically, here Justice Rehnquist is willing
to acknowledge that speech rights can be distorted by unequal distributions of wealth. But cf. Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, upholds regulations that deny poor
women dependent on federally funded family planning counseling the full information on all legal options
that other women receive).
76. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-96.
77. DREW, supra note 6, at 134-45.
78. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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consistently struck down prohibitions on contributions and expenditures in
connection with referenda campaigns.79 But if corruption includes the distort-
ing effects of large amounts of wealth on the political debate, corruption is no
less troubling in referenda than in candidate elections."0 Thus, this distinction
also seems destined to fall in light of the Austin Court's redefinition of corrup-
tion.
The remaining distinctions drawn by the Court in its campaign finance
decisions are specific to its corporate campaign spending jurisprudence-
distinctions between corporations and individuals, for-profit and nonprofit
corporations, media corporations and other corporations-and therefore are
taken up in part II. I will argue that these distinctions, despite the Austin
majority's attempts to save them, are also subverted by the Court's redefinition
of corruption.
II. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
It is no accident that the Court first acknowledged the systemic distorting
effects of capital in a decision addressing the regulation of corporate campaign
spending. The corporate form appears both to permit and to require special
treatment. It permits regulation because a corporation is a creature of the state,
and therefore it is easier to conceive of changing the rules that determine its
construction. At the same time, the corporate form requires special regulation,
because otherwise its economic advantages, provided and maintained by law,
can be used to buy out the political marketplace of ideas.
The Supreme Court's approach to regulation of corporate campaign spend-
ing, however, is no more coherent than its treatment of limits on individual
spending. At times, the Court has allowed Congress to treat corporate speakers
quite differently from individual speakers;"' at other times, it has suggested
that corporate speech must receive the same First Amendment protection as
individual speech.2 It has rarely addressed the issue of corporate campaign
spending head-on. Only once has it adjudicated a for-profit corporation's chal-
lenge to campaign spending restrictions." The rest of the decisions that
79. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.
80. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 307 n.3 (White, dissenting) (detailing the
distorting effects of massive one-sided corporate spending on referenda issues); J. Skelly Wright, Money
and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 609, 623-25 (1982) (examples of effects of spending on referenda); C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-
Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish 's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
646, 647 n.8 (1982) (same).
81. 110 S.Ct. 1391; Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197
(1982) (upholding restriction on corporation's solicitations for political advocacy; no such restriction on
individuals or unincorporated associations).
82. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.
83. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.
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discuss corporate campaign speech involve labor unions and nonprofit corpo-
rations. For years, the Court did its best to avoid the constitutional issues
presented even in the cases it did take. Perhaps as a result of this sidelong ap-
proach to the issue, the Court has done little to reconcile its contradictory
leanings vis-A-vis corporate speech.
A. The First Seventy Years: Techniques of Avoidance
Campaign spending regulation began with corporations. The first important
calls for campaign finance reform came in the post-Civil War era, and were
addressed to the concentration of corporate wealth produced by the industrial
revolution. In 1894, Elihu Root argued for restricting corporate campaign
contributions before the New York Constitutional Convention:
The idea is to prevent ...the great railroad companies, the great insurance
companies, the great telephone companies, the great aggregations of wealth from
using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the legisla-
ture to these halls in order to vote for their protection and the advancement of
their interests as against those of the public. It strikes at a constantly growing evil
which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of small means
of this country in our political institutions than any other practice which has ever
obtained since the foundation of our Government. And I believe that the time has
come when something ought to be done to put a check to the giving of $50,000
or $100,000 by a great corporation toward political purposes upon the understand-
ing that a debt is created from a political party to it."
After repeated entreaties from President Theodore Roosevelt and others to rein
in corporate wealth in campaigns, Congress passed the Tillman Act of 1907,
which barred corporations from making money contributions to candidates for
federal office.8 5 Congress subsequently expanded this restriction on several
occasions, first to prohibit all corporate contributions, 6 then to include unions
within the prohibition, 7 and finally, in 1947, to bar corporations and unions
from making expenditures as well as contributions in connection with federal
campaigns. 8
When Congress enacted these regulations, its concern was quite plainly the
systemic distorting effects caused by corporate wealth. It sought to "destroy[ ]
the influence over elections which corporations exercised through financial
84. ELIHU ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSIP 143 (1916) quoted in United States
v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957)).
85. Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 864, 865, at ch. 420.
86. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074, at § 313.
87. War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 163, 167, at § 1509, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862.; Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60, at § 304.
88. § 304, 61 Stat. at 159-60. For a brief history of the development of these restrictions, see UAW,
352 U.S. at 570-84; Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401-13 (1972); see
also FRANCES SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 29-33 (1988).
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contribution." 9 Secondarily, Congress felt that "corporate officials had no
moral right to use corporate funds for contribution to political parties without
the consent of the stockholders. "* But Congress's principal concern was that
corporations had undue influence as a result of their concentrated wealth. The
regulatory impulse was part of a wider trend toward limiting the newfound
power of corporations and setting some limits on wealth inequity in industrial
America:
The concentration of wealth consequent upon the industrial expansion in the post-
Civil War era had profound implications for American life. The impact of the
abuses resulting from this concentration gradually made itself felt by a rising tide
of reform protest in the last decade of the nineteenth century. The Sherman Law
was a response to the felt threat to economic freedom created by enormous
industrial combines. The income tax law of 1894 reflected congressional concern
over the growing disparity of income between the many and the few. No less
lively, although slower to evoke federal action, was popular feeling that aggregat-
ed capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of corrup-
tion.91
Similar concerns motivated Congress's subsequent regulations, all of which
were "calculated to avoid the deleterious influence on federal elections result-
ing from the use of money by those who exercise control over large aggrega-
tions of capital. "92
Congress debated the constitutionality of restricting corporate activity each
time it passed a new law, but on the few occasions that the laws were actually
enforced, the Supreme Court went out of its way to avoid deciding the consti-
tutional issues posed, even as it expressed serious concerns. Thus, in United
States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,93 the Court's first look at
restrictions on corporate expenditures, it construed section 313 of the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act not to apply to a union's endorsement of a congressional
candidate in its weekly newspaper. The plain language of the statute, which
barred any expenditures in connection with a federal election, clearly covered
this conduct. But the Court declined to adopt such an interpretation, because
it would have raised "the gravest doubt" about the law's constitutionality. 94
The Act's legislative history suggested one narrowing construction: it was at
least arguable that Congress did not intend to bar expenditures of funds raised
voluntarily, such as from subscriptions and sales of the newspaper, as opposed
to funds obtained from the union treasury or union dues. 9 The Court went
89. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948); see also United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567,
572 (1957) (initial federal restrictions on corporate campaign spending reflected "popular sentiment for
federal action to purge national politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of 'big money'
campaign contributions").
90. CIO, 335 U.S. at 113.
91. UAW, 352 U.S. at 570.
92. Id. at 585.
93. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
94. Id. at 121.
95. Id. at 116-20.
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even further than this legislative history, however, and held that the statute did
not prohibit any regular union or corporate publications from taking positions
on federal elections, whatever the source of its funds.96
This construction, improbable as it seemed, did allow the Court to avoid
deciding the constitutionality of the statute. In so doing, however, the Court
also largely defeated both stated purposes of the statute. The rationales Con-
gress had put forth for regulating corporate and union campaign spending were
two-fold: (1) to "destroy[ ] the influence over elections which corporations
[and unions] exercised,""' and (2) to protect shareholders and union members
who objected to the use of corporate or union funds to promote political causes
that they do not support.98 By the CIO Court's reading, however, corpora-
tions and unions could spend treasury funds on endorsements of candidates as
long as they did so in their regular publications, thereby creating a loophole
for the exercise of considerable financial influence, and coercing dissenting
shareholders and union members to support those candidates whom they might
otherwise oppose.
Justices Rutledge, Black, Douglas and Murphy agreed that the indictments
should be dismissed, but disagreed sharply on the reasoning." They criticized
the majority for disingenuously rewriting the statute, and concluded that
properly interpreted, it prohibited the CIO's conduct. They therefore reached
the First Amendment issues, and found numerous constitutional infirmities in
the statute, infirmities echoed in the dissents of Justices Scalia and Kennedy
forty-two years later in Austin. 1 Justice Rutledge questioned whether the
government's interest in counteracting unions' and corporations' "undue
influence" could be reconciled with a pluralistic democracy, reasoning that
"[tihe expression of bloc sentiment is and always has been an integral part of
our democratic electoral and legislative process."101 Even if it were legiti-
mate to curb union and corporate influence, Justice Rutledge found the statute's
total prohibition on any spending by corporations and unions too restric-
tive."° And he considered the prohibition on "expenditures in connection
with" any federal election too vague, particularly as on its face it could apply
to expression by the corporate media.l"t
Thus, the first time the Court addressed the issue of campaign spending
restrictions on corporations or unions, every member of the Court expressed
96. Id. at 121.
97. Id. at 113.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 129-30 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 165-184. Neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Kennedy cites
Justice Rutledge's concurrence.
101. CIO, 335 U.S. at 143 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result).
102. Id. at 146.
103. Id. at 151-54.
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grave constitutional reservations, and the majority only avoided holding the
statute unconstitutional by revising the statute so that it allowed precisely what
Congress sought to forbid. The Court's initial approach did not bode well for
future regulation of corporate speech.
The next time these issues arose, the Court again declined to decide the
constitutional issues. In United States v. UAW, °4 the United States sought
to prosecute the UAW under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act for using union
dues to run television commercials endorsing certain congressional candidates.
Following the Supreme Court's lead in CIO, the district court interpreted the
statute not to cover the conduct alleged, and granted UAW's motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court reversed. This time the Court construed the statute to
prohibit the alleged expenditures, but nonetheless declined to address the
union's constitutional defenses because it believed they could be better decided
after trial on a more complete record. 5 Justice Douglas dissented on consti-
tutional grounds, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black, largely
reiterating Justice Rutledge's analysis from CIO.' o
The Court did not revisit corporate campaign spending until 1972. In
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States,'O° the Court again avoided
the constitutional questions posed, this time reversing a conviction for improper
jury instructions. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, construed the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act to forbid corporate and union expenditures in
connection with federal campaigns only when the funds were not voluntarily
obtained. Emphasizing Congress's secondary concern for protecting minority
stockholders and union members, the Court concluded that this concern was
not implicated as long as the funds had been donated voluntarily (i.e., did not
come from union dues or the corporate treasury). 08
The dissenters, this time Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger, again
took the majority to task for misconstruing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.
Under the majority's interpretation, the dissenters argued, Congress's primary
purpose in enacting the legislation would be defeated. Congress was concerned
not only with protecting minority union members and shareholders, but also,
and more importantly, with minimizing the influence of labor unions and
corporations on elections. By allowing unions and corporations to expend
"voluntarily" raised monies, the majority had succeeded in "rendering ineffec-
tual the basic intention of the Congress to prevent the intrusion of corporate
104. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
105. Id. at 592 (noting several factual questions which might be resolved at trial). As the dissent
pointed out, however, few if any of these questions would have had any bearing on the union's constitution-
al challenge. Id. at 595-96 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
107. 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
108. Id. at 409.
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and union power into our political system.""
Justice Brennan's response to this charge is instructive, for it reappears in
Austin. He acknowledged that Congress was "concerned not only to protect
minority interests within the union but to eliminate the effect of aggregated
wealth on federal elections."11 But he then conflated the two concerns by
maintaining that Congress's concern with aggregated wealth ran only to the
diversion of union and corporate general treasury funds, and not to "funds
donated by union [or corporation] members of their own free and knowing
choice. " " This reading of Congress's concern brought the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act into alignment with the recently enacted Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971, in which Congress had explicitly permitted corporations
and unions to set up separate segregated funds consisting of voluntarily donated
monies for political expenditures. 1 2 It also allowed the Court once again to
avoid the constitutional challenge to restricting corporate campaign spending.
B. The Modem Approach to Corporate Spending
As a result of the above three decisions, federal restrictions singling out
corporate campaign spending were on the books for some seventy years before
the Supreme Court even addressed the threshold question of whether corporate
speech is entitled to different First Amendment protection from individuals'
speech. When the Court did finally address that question, its decision was
something of a surprise. Brushing aside seventy years of history, the Court in
First National Bank v. Bellotti"3 held that restrictions on corporations'
speech must be treated the same as limits on individuals' speech. Since then,
the Court appears to have been engaged in a prolonged attempt to revise (or
reverse) Bellotti, culminating in Austin, which effectively comes out the other
way. But in order to do so, the Court first had to see through the blinders of
quid pro quo corruption and laissez-faire.
1. Bellotti-Equating individual and corporate speech. In Bellotti, the Court
held that corporate speech deserves full First Amendment protection, and
struck down a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporate expenditures on
referenda issues unrelated to the corporation's business interests. Rejecting an
argument that corporations should receive less First Amendment protection
109. Id. at 449 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 416.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 409-10. Corporations and unions had been engaging in the practice of raising voluntary
funds through political action committees for many years. In 1971, however, labor unions, "concerned
that [their] right to establish political-action committees would be challenged by the Nixon Administration's
Justice Department.... backed an amendment ... which stated that the prohibition of direct contributions
of treasury money by unions and corporations did not prevent them from establishing PACs using voluntary
contributions." DREW, supra note 6, at 9.
113. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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than human beings, the Court adopted a laissez-faire marketplace perspective,
reasoning that a robust exchange of ideas requires that speech be protected
irrespective of its source. 14 The Court rejected an argument that corporate
spending skews the electoral marketplace, and reiterated its narrow view of
corruption as limited to quid pro quo bribes. Thus, the decision is guided by
the same twin metaphors that governed the Court's approach to individual
campaign spending restrictions. 15
A close reading of the Bellotti decision, however, shows signs of ambiva-
lence on the subject of regulating campaign spending. In rejecting
Massachusetts' rationales for the regulation, the Court simultaneously offered
narrow case-specific reasons for finding the rationales insufficient, and regis-
tered broader doubts that questioned whether restricting corporate campaign
spending would ever be justified. For example, Massachusetts argued that
without regulation corporate participation would drown out the viewpoints of
those less wealthy and diminish citizen participation." 6 The Court rejected
this argument for want of evidence: "If appellee's arguments were supported
by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently
to undermine democratic processes . . . these arguments would merit our
consideration."" 7 At the same time, however, the Court implicitly questioned
whether such a concern would ever be legitimate. It restricted its "corruption"
analysis to quid pro quo bribes, and reasserted the laissez-faire principle that
government may not "'restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others.'"' And its statement of what
the record would have to show-"imminent" danger-echoed the standard for
proscribing subversive speech in Brandenburg v. Ohio,"9 a nearly impossible
standard to satisfy.
The Court took a similarly ambivalent stance toward Massachusetts' second
rationale- "protecting the rights of shareholders whose views differ from those
expressed by management on behalf of the corporation." 2 Adopting a nar-
row approach, the Court maintained that the statute was not carefully tailored
to further the stated end of protecting minority shareholders, because it barred
corporate campaign expenditures even where all shareholders agreed with the
corporation's point of view.' But in a footnote, the Court expressed skepti-
114. Id. at 776-83.
115. See supra part I.C.1.
116. 435 U.S. at 789.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 790-91 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)).
119. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
120. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 787.
121. The Court found the restriction both underinclusive and overinclusive from the vantage point
of protecting dissenting shareholders. It was underinclusive because while barring corporate expenditures
in connection with a referendum, it allowed corporations to use treasury funds for lobbying or to advocate
views on any issue that had not yet become a referendum issue. Id. at 793. The statute was overinclusive
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cism about the underlying premise that dissenting shareholders' views are in
need of protection at all, since a shareholder "invests in a corporation of his
own volition and is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any
reason. "122
The Bellotti decision could have been very narrowly written. The statute
at issue imposed viewpoint-based censorship. It was enacted in response to a
series of referenda campaigns on graduated income tax proposals, in each of
which corporations opposed to the tax far outspent its supporters and the
proposals were subsequently defeated."z It singled out for specific prohibi-
tion expenditures on the income tax issue."24 Thus, the statute appeared to
be designed to suppress a particular point of view on a specific issue, the kind
of legislation most vulnerable to First Amendment invalidation. s Although
the majority twice adverted to this fact, 126 it did not limit its decision to this
narrow ground, but also addressed the broader issues posed by corporate
speech.
If, as Bellotti announced, corporations' rights to speak were as fully
protected as an individual's, the time-honored tradition of restricting corporate
expenditures in candidate elections would be unconstitutional. The Court had
already invalidated such restrictions on individual expenditures, 27 and
Bellotti appeared to reject the most obvious basis for distinction-that corporate
speech deserved less First Amendment protection than individuals' speech. The
Bellotti Court was careful in a footnote to distinguish the existing federal
restrictions on corporate speech in candidate elections ,128 but its rationale
seemed to sweep well beyond the particulars of the Massachusetts statute.
At the same time, however, the Bellotti Court's oscillations between broad
language and specific facts suggested that the Court was not willing to write
off corporate spending restrictions altogether. For example, the Court's nod
to the possibility of demonstrating a threat to political integrity from corporate
spending'29 reflects at least muted recognition of the potential problems posed
by the use of private concentrations of wealth to buy up speech opportunities.
In this area of polar dangers, the Court clearly stressed the perils of state
censorship, but was not quite willing to ignore the converse dangers posed by
because it barred corporate expenditures in referenda campaigns even if the shareholders unanimously
supported the corporation's position. Id. at 794.
122. Id. at 794 n.34.
123. Id. at 769 n.3; id. at 810-11 (White, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 768.
125. As the Court stated in City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984): "There are
some purported interests-such as a desire to suppress support for ... an unpopular cause, or to exclude
the expression of certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas-that are so plainly illegitimate that
they would immediately invalidate the rule." Id. at 804.
126. 435 U.S. at 785, 793.
127. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
128. 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
129. Id. at 789.
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unregulated corporate treasuries.
2. FEC v. National Right To Work Committee-A deferential retreat. The
Court soon cut back on the broad protection for corporate speech advanced
in Bellotti. In a series of cases challenging restraints on the political activity
of nonprofit ideological corporations, the Court established a rationale for
restricting campaign speech by for-profit corporations. The seeds for the
rationale were sown in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee
(NRWC),130 a brief and often-overlooked campaign finance decision. The
NRWC decision is remarkable principally for what it does not say. It apparently
sparked little controversy among the Justices. They issued a unanimous opinion
upholding the restriction, allowed Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in Bellotti,
to write the decision, and devoted only five pages to the constitutional issues.
Yet, notwithstanding the Court's claim that its decision was "entirely consis-
tent" with Bellotti, 131 the Court's approach and result could not have been
more different. Where Bellotti demanded rigorous showings of imminent
danger and closely-tailored remedies to justify regulating corporate speech, the
Court in NRWC simply deferred to Congress's judgment that regulation of the
corporate form was necessary. And where Bellotti refused to allow the state
to treat corporations' speech differently from that of human beings, the Court
in NRWC concluded that "there is no reason why [Congress] may not...
treat[ ] unions, corporations, and similar organizations differently from individ-
uals. "132
The Federal Election Campaign Act requires corporations to create segre-
gated funds comprised solely of monies voluntarily donated for campaign
expenditures,133 and restricts solicitation for donations to such funds to
"members" or shareholders of the corporation. 134 The NRWC, an ideological
nonprofit corporation without formal members, challenged the application to
it of the provisions limiting solicitation of funds to "members."
The Court acknowledged that the challenged restriction infringed NRWC's
First Amendment rights of association, but concluded that those rights were
"overborne by the interests Congress has sought to protect ... "13 The
interests that justified the infringement were precisely those deemed insufficient
in Bellotti: "To ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the
special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should
not be converted into political 'war chests,'" 136 and "to protect the individu-
als who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than
130. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
131. Id. at 210 n.7.
132. Id. at 210-11 (citation omitted).
133. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2)(C) (1988).
134. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A), (C).
135. 459 U.S. at 207.
136. Id. at 207.
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the support of candidates from having that money used to support political
candidates to whom they may be opposed." 13 7 In Bellotti, the Court rejected
the first rationale for lack of a record demonstrating that the structural prob-
lems alleged actually existed; in NRWC, the Court excused the absence of a
record, stating that "it is the potential for such influence that demands regula-
tion.""3 The Bellotti Court rejected the second rationale after carefully mea-
suring the fit between the statute and its stated purpose; in NRWC, the Court
accepted without discussion the dubious claim that this interest justified impos-
ing the restriction on a nonprofit ideological corporation, whose donors would
have no reason to support it other than its political advocacy.139
The NRWC decision is short on reasoning and long on deference. Justice
Rehnquist, who takes a dim view of corporations' rights in any event,' 40
maintained that the Court owed "considerable deference" to the history of
"careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws.., to account for
the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organi-
zations .. "141 The NRWC Court's deference to congressional attempts to
control corporations' economic advantages is a far cry from its strict scrutiny
approach in Bellotti. 142 Deference, however, is not enough to justify the
infringement of First Amendment rights. NRWC marked a change in the
Court's attitude toward campaign regulation, but did not provide the substan-
tive justifications necessary to sustain the change in subsequent constitutional
disputes.
3. FEC v. MCFL-The origins of a new approach. The Court first gave
137. Id. at 208.
138. Id. at 210.
139. The NRWC decision is also difficult to square with the Court's pre-Belloti treatment of federal
campaign legislation. In NRWC, the Court essentially inverted the analysis used in UAW and Pipefitters,
where it had emphasized the protection of minority shareholders and largely overlooked Congress's
structural concern about corporate power. Here, the Court focused almost entirely on the need to counteract
the potential for corruption from corporate economic strength, virtually ignoring the argument about
dissenting shareholders. No doubt it did so in part of necessity. It would be difficult to maintain that the
solicitation provision was designed to protect NRWC members or shareholders, since NRWC had neither.
And the particular restriction challenged limited NRWC's ability to solicit nonmembers, a limitation which
has no apparent relationship to members' rights. Finally, as NRWC is an expressly ideological association,
those who support it are far less likely to be "coerced" into supporting views they oppose.
140. In an approach similar in spirit to his positivist "bitter-with-the-sweet" analysis of procedural
due process claims, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.), Justice
Rehnquist believes that as creatures of the state, corporations are largely dependent upon state law for any
liberty rights that they may or not have. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822-28
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm., 475 U.S. 1, 32-35
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Accordingly, he consistently votes to uphold restrictions on corporate
speech, although for reasons that no other Justice appears to subscribe to.
141. NRWC, 459 U.S. at 209.
142. The Court managed to reconcile Bellotti only by narrowly characterizing Congress's concern
as one attached to the corruption of candidate elections, a concern not present in referenda elections. Id.
at 210 n.7. This distinction was consistent with the Buckley Court's narrow conception of quid pro quo
corruption, but it did not accurately reflect Congress's actual structural concern, which related much more
broadly to the undue influence corporations and unions have on the electoral process. See supra text
accompanying notes 84-92.
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substance to its new approach to corporate campaign spending in Federal
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL). 143 As in
NRWC, the issue before the Court concerned the application of corporate
campaign spending constraints to a nonprofit ideological corporation. This
time, the Court held the statute's application unconstitutional, but in reaching
that result, the Court strongly endorsed Congress's power to regulate campaign
spending by for-profit corporations. MCFL, a nonprofit corporation opposed
to abortion, challenged the Federal Election Campaign Act requirement that
corporations create separate segregated funds supported by voluntary contri-
butions for expenditures in connection with federal campaigns.'"
The Court wrote a wide-ranging opinion that said as much about the
government's right to regulate expenditures of for-profit business corporations
as it did about the rights of nonprofit ideological corporations to be free of
regulation.'45 It is in MCFL, a decision joined by Justice Scalia among oth-
ers, 146 and not in Austin, that the "New Corruption" decried by Justice Scalia
in Austin first appeared. In MCFL the Court for the first time acknowledged
that "the unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes"""v can corrupt
"the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas. "148 The danger is not
simply that a particular politician will be beholden to a wealthy supporter, but
that "competition among actors in the political arena [will not be] truly compe-
tition among ideas."14
The Court viewed the segregated fund requirement as a response to this
form of corruption:
Political 'free trade' does not necessarily require that all who participate in the
political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources. Relative availability of
funds is after all a rough barometer of public support. The resources in the
treasury of a business corporation, however, are not an indication of popular
support for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the economically
motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources
may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power
143. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
144. Without establishing a segregated fund, MCFL had prepared and widely distributed a "Special
Election Edition" of its newsletter which listed and pictured candidates who shared its opposition to abortion
and urged its readers to "VOTE PRO-LIFE." Id. at 243-44.
145. The Court had previously struck down restrictions on independent expenditures on the ground
that expenditures do not present the danger of quid pro quo corruption, so it could have written a per
curiam opinion invalidating the statute with citations to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and FEC
v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985). See discussion supra part I.C.2.
146. Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, Scalia, and O'Connor. Justice
O'Connor concurred separately only to register her disagreement with Justice Brennan's treatment of
disclosure requirements as a burden on First Amendment interests. 479 U.S. at 265 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). She viewed the organizational damands of a segregated
fund as the only significant burden on MCFL's First Amendment interests. Id. at 266.
147. Id. at 259.
148. Id. at 257.
149. Id. at 259.
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of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas."5
By restricting a corporation's spending to monies donated voluntarily to an
expressly political fund, the law ensures that the money the corporation has
to spend for political purposes is in fact a rough barometer of its political
support, rather than a barometer of its widget-manufacturing abilities."1
The Court concluded, however, that the segregated fund requirement could
not be applied constitutionally to MCFL because it did not pose the danger of
"unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes. "112 As a nonprofit ideo-
logical corporation, MCFL's resources "are not a function of its success in
the economic marketplace, but its popularity in the political marketplace."153
People support MCFL if they support its political viewpoint; there is no other
reason to "invest" in MCFL. At the close of its opinion, the Court noted three
characteristics of MCFL that were "essential to [its] holding": (1) it was
formed to promote political ideas, not to engage in business, so those who
support it do so for political reasons only; (2) it has no shareholders, so its
supporters do not have an economic disincentive for disassociation with it if
they disagree with its political activity; and (3) it was not established by a
union or a business corporation and did not accept contributions from such
entities."54 Corporations exhibiting these features do not pose the dangers that
Congress sought to prevent and, therefore, their campaign expenditures may
not be restricted.
The Court acknowledged that the class of corporations that would meet
these criteria might be small, but insisted that it was nonetheless critical that
they be free of regulation. Where freedom of speech is concerned, the Court
150. Id. at 257-58 (citations omitted).
151. Even under such a regulatory scheme, however, the funds a corporation expends are an extremely
rough barometer of popular support for its political ideas. See infra part Ill.
The Court in MCFL also shed new light on the second interest underlying regulation of corporate
campaign spending-protection of minority shareholders. The Court acknowledged that this interest had
been articulated as a ground for upholding the restrictions in NRWC, but then went on to undermine any
possible reason for relying on this interest where, as in both MCFL and NRWC, the regulated corporations
are nonprofit and ideological. Supporters donate monies to such organizations, the Court wrote, precisely
because they agree with the group's ideological bent, and they understand that by associating with others
they can amplify their voices. Such association therefore "necessarily involves at least some degree of
delegation of authority to use such funds in a manner that best serves the shared political purposes of the
organization and contributor." 479 U.S. at 261. Given that delegation, there is little reason to protect
contributors to, or members of, a nonprofit ideological corporation by limiting the corporation's speech.
The only problem with this analysis was that it appeared to contradict the Court's reliance in NRWC,
albeit unexplained, on this interest to justify restricting a nonprofit corporation. Justice Brennan sought
to distinguish NRWC by pointing to the difference between contributions and expenditures and noting that
"the Government enjoys greater latitude in limiting contributions than in regulating independent expendi-
tures." Id. at 261-62. But as would become clear in Austin, the contribution-expenditure distinction itself
makes no sense once the government's corruption concern is understood to include the distorting effects
of wealth on the political marketplace of ideas. Such systemic distortion can be caused as easily by unequal
expenditures as by unequal contributions.
152. 479 U.S. at 259.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 264.
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stated, "we must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech as we
are against its sweeping restriction."155 Thus, in finding the law's application
to MCFL unconstitutional, the Court again took up the active review it had
dropped in NRWC.
At the same time, however, the Court provided an affirmative legal ratio-
nale for regulating corporate expenditures. The significance of MCFL lies in
its recognition, albeit in dicta, of the state's legitimate interest in counteracting
the systemic corrupting effects of corporate wealth on political debate. That
recognition, which extends far beyond the Court's restrictive quid pro quo
vision of corruption, simultaneously necessitates a rejection of the laissez-faire
model of the marketplace of ideas. In MCFL, the Court adopted an explicitly
interventionist view of the government's responsibility vis-h-vis the marketplace
of ideas. From this perspective, the fact that the government has granted
corporations certain legal advantages authorizes the government to ensure that
those advantages are not translated into unfair advantage in the political
marketplace of ideas. In short, the Court in MCFL recognized that government
may play a kind of First Amendment antitrust role in the marketplace of ideas;
it can seek to offset unfair advantages of some speakers in order to render the
field more competitive.
MCFL's recognition of this governmental role, however, was only dicta.
It held that such regulation was not permissible as applied to the nonprofit
ideological corporation before the Court. It was not until Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce156 that the Court expressly relied on this rationale to
uphold a restriction on corporate speech.
4. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce-New corruption and the
demise of laissez-faire. Austin made explicit and binding the themes that MCFL
developed in dicta, thus placing the Court firmly on the road toward a First
Amendment antitrust vision of the marketplace of ideas. In Austin, moreover,
the Court for the first time linked as a constitutional matter the two interests
always advanced for campaign finance regulation, and showed that they serve
the same legitimate end-correcting the unfair advantage of the corporate form
in the political marketplace of ideas.
The corporation at issue in Austin was again a nonprofit ideological corpo-
ration-the Michigan Chamber of Commerce. But three-quarters of the
Chamber's 8,000 members were for-profit business corporations, and its
interests principally were to further the business interests of its members.
Thus, although it was a nonprofit corporation, and although its pro-business
orientation was certainly as ideological as MCFL's pro-life views, the Cham-
ber was intimately tied to and supported by for-profit corporations. The
155. Id. at 265.
156. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
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majority found this distinction from MCFL critical and upheld a segregated
fund requirement as applied to the Chamber of Commerce.
Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court,"' and Justice Brennan,
the author of MCFL, concurred. The difference between the two opinions lay
in their characterization of the compelling state interest. Justice Marshall's
opinion stressed the state's interest in countering the systemic distorting effects
of corporate wealth, while Justice Brennan highlighted the state's interest in
protecting dissenting shareholders and members.
Justice Marshall's opinion made unmistakably clear what MCFL had
established: that the government's interest in deterring "corruption" is not
limited to "'financial quid pro quo' corruption," but includes "a different type
of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas.""'8 He stressed that the significant fact is
not simply that corporations have a lot of money, but that they have it because
of "the unique state-conferred corporate structure."'59 "State law grants
corporations special advantages. . . that enhance their ability to attract capital
. . . . These state-created advantages also permit them to use 'resources
amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace.'"16 Thus, Justice Marshall explicitly tied the state's
interest in limiting the distorting impact of corporate wealth on public debate
to the state's responsibility for the corporate concentration of wealth. If this
reasoning were taken to its extreme, it might support an argument that the First
Amendment requires the state to limit corporate political speech. 61 At a
minimum, however, it provides a ground for finding the state's interest
compelling.
Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall's majority opinion, but also wrote
separately to emphasize the importance of the state's other interest, protecting
dissenting shareholders or members. Building on his opinion eighteen years
earlier in Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States,162 which had
come close to characterizing this interest as Congress's only interest, Justice
157. Justice Marshall's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan,
White, Blackmun, and Stevens.
158. 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
159. Id. at 1398.
160. Id. at 1397 (quoting MCFL, 107 S. Ct. at 627).
161. Indeed, Justice Marshall used just such an argument to construct a short-lived First Amendment
right of access to private shopping malls. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 319 (1968); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)
(distinguishing and restricting holding of Logan Valley); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1976)
(holding that Lloyd Corp. had overruled Logan Valley). In the shopping mall cases, as here, Justice
Marshall pointed to the state's role in protecting private wealth, thereby piercing the public-private
distinction that otherwise frustrates efforts at achieving equality in spheres generally regarded as "private."
162. 407 U.S. 385 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes 107-112.
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Brennan noted that the two interests are in fact integrally related: it is by
protecting the dissenting shareholder that the state ensures that the corpora-
tion's voice reflects the amount of popular support for its ideas. 63 By pierc-
ing the corporate veil and looking to the rights of shareholders and members
not to support political views they oppose, the state is able to distill the
corporation's speech so that it reflects no more than the accumulation of its
supporters' political views."
The spirited Austin dissents, while perhaps a little belated given the devel-
opments in MCFL, accurately perceived that the Austin majority's approach
heralded a new understanding of the First Amendment. Where the laissez-faire
model had focused almost exclusively on the threats to free expression posed
by public actors, the First Amendment antitrust model recognized that a robust
and wide-open debate could also be undermined by powerful private actors.
This recognition requires a wholesale rethinking of the role of the government
in the marketplace of ideas.
The dissenters leveled three principal critiques at the majority's analysis:
(1) they questioned whether the majority's rationale could be squared with
Buckley, for it seemed to justify government regulation of individuals' cam-
paign expenditures; (2) they saw no satisfactory way to distinguish media
corporations from other corporations, and therefore questioned whether the
majority's approach would justify regulating press coverage of campaigns; and
(3) they attacked the majority's redefinition of the state's interest in averting
corruption. The first two critiques are well-founded, but accepting them does
not lead to the dissent's conclusion, namely, that government regulation is
impermissible. The third critique is accurate; the majority did redefine the
state's corruption interest. But the question is not which definition came first,
but which one more accurately captures the real problem with campaign
finance.
Both dissenting opinions ask why, if counteracting the distorting effects of
concentrated wealth is a compelling state interest, the state could not also
163. 110 S. Ct. at 1403-04 (Brennan, J., concurring).
164. The Chamber of Commerce maintained that even if these interests were compelling as applied
to regulation of for-profit corporations, a point arguably conceded by Justice Kennedy's dissent, id. at 1405
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 1421 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)), they were insufficient to justify
restricting the Chamber because, like MCFL, it is a nonprofit ideological corporation. Justices Marshall
and Brennan both rejected that argument, concluding that the Chamber shared none of the three features
found essential to the MCFL result. First, its purposes are not exclusively political, but include the provision
of social and educational services for its members, and therefore its dues will reflect not only support for
its political advocacy but also support for its other services. Second, while the Chamber itself has no
shareholders, many of its members are corporations, which do have shareholders. To the extent that
corporations pay their dues out of corporate treasuries, the Chamber's funds are ultimately attributable to
shareholders with an economic disincentive to disassociate. Moreover, the Chambers' own members also
have economic disincentives to disassociate, because they may value the nonpolitical services the Chamber
provides. Third, and most importantly, the Chamber is comprised primarily of corporations, so that if it
were free of the restrictions applicable to corporations it could be used to circumvent the limits on corporate
political spending. See id. at 1399-1400; id. at 1404-06 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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restrict the campaign expenditures of wealthy individuals. 6" This is a good
question, to which there may be no clear answer. But the absence of an
answer, far from refuting the notion that the state has a compelling interest,
only underscores how deep the problem of undue influence runs. Wealthy
individuals, like corporations, exercise substantial influence (well beyond their
votes) over the outcome of elections. Moreover, wealthy individuals, like
corporations, owe their wealth in some measure to benefits and protections
accorded by the state. Some of these state benefits are direct, such as the
state's enforcement of private property rights, and others are indirect, such as
the advantages accorded to the corporations from which many wealthy individ-
uals' fortunes are derived. If the existence of concentrated wealth attributable
in part to state-created advantages creates a compelling interest justifying the
restriction of corporate spending, it may also justify limits on individual
spending.
One possible way of distinguishing regulation of corporations is that their
statutory character makes it easier for the state to construct a rule "narrowly
tailored" to its compelling interest. The artificial quality of the corporation
permits the State to manipulate the statutory rules so that they are narrowly
tailored to good instrumental ends. Thus, FECA does not prohibit corporate
speech outright, but creates a set of rules for corporate speakers designed to
separate the corporation's political appeal from its economic strength.
Individuals and their rights, in contrast, are seen as natural, and therefore
less easy to divide and distill. But this is surely a superficial distinction.
Socially constructed legal rules similarly lead to and maintain great disparities
in wealth accumulated by individuals."6 More importantly, what individuals
may do with the social resources they accumulate is ultimately as subject to
socially constructed rules as what corporations can do. For example, we do
not permit wealthy individuals to purchase slaves, babies, illegal drugs, or,
for the most part, the services of prostitutes. We set certain limits on what
individuals can do with their money for the greater good of the collective, or
to protect other persons' rights, just as we restrict corporate campaign financ-
ing to further the greater good of the collective and to protect the rights of the
less wealthy. Thus, the statutory nature of a corporation does not appear to
justify singling out corporations for restrictions. 167
A second possible distinction between individuals and corporations-one
rejected by the Court in Bellotti and Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public
165. Id. at 1411 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1421-22 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
167. Moreover, the failure to restrict individual spending will also undermine the "purifying" effect
of the segregated fund requirement. If the individuals who benefit most from the corporate form are free
to expend large amounts of money, the corporation's wealth will be infused into the political marketplace
of ideas by passing through the individuals most indebted to the corporation.
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Utilities Commission 16 smight focus on the relative value of their speech.
If we focus on value to the speaker rather than value to the audience, a
corporation's speech may be less deserving of First Amendment protection than
an individual's. C. Edwin Baker argues, for example, that the First Amend-
ment is designed to protect the freely-chosen expression of speakers, in order
to further liberty interests in self-realization and self-determination. Corpora-
tions, he maintains, do not engage in freely-chosen expression, because they
are constrained by the drive for profits, and therefore do not deserve First
Amendment protection. 69
But individuals are also constrained in their expression, by such forces as
ideology, culture, class, and economics. Moreover, the profit motive, while
it may constrain, does not determine the content of a corporation's speech. A
corporation that concluded that support of the arts would serve its profit
interests, for example, might well have at least the same range of choice of
art to support as would a human being or an unincorporated association. More
importantly, the liberty approach ignores the structural value that a corpora-
tion's speech might have for listening human beings-the value that led the
Court in Bellotti to accord corporate speech protection in the first place.
Corporations are important participants in our social structure, and the public
has a First Amendment interest in hearing their positions articulated.
The question whether Austin's approach applies to media corporations may
be even more difficult. The Michigan statute in Austin exempted from regula-
tion any "expenditure by a broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical or publication for any news story, commentary, or editorial in
support of or in opposition to a candidate for elective office.., in the regular
course of publication or broadcasting. "70 The majority acknowledged that
such differential treatment of media corporations required a compelling state
interest, but found one in the state's desire not to hinder the press from
performing its institutional function of "reporting on and publishing editorials
about newsworthy events," in this case, a political campaign.1
71
As Justice Scalia pointed out, however, this rationale suggests that while
the state may exempt media corporations from such regulations, it is not
required to do so. Indeed, the special role of the media could just as well argue
for regulating media corporations, because the media are particularly well
positioned to exert undue influence on the political debate. 17' Moreover, the
168. 475 U.S. 1 (1985).
169. BAKER, supra note 16, at 194-224.
170. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 169.206(3)(d) (1979); cf. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1988).
171. 110 S. Ct. at 1402.
172. Id. at 1414-15; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 796-97 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) ("[1it could be argued that ... media conglomerates ... pose a much more realistic threat to valid
interests than do [corporations] not regularly concerned with shaping popular opinion on public issues.").
The perennial issue of the effect of television predictions of election results is only a small example of the
problem. Candidates' preoccupation with obtaining and spinning media campaign coverage underscores
Vol. 9:236, 1991
First Amendment Antitrust
majority's reasoning seems inconsistent with the principle that the press is not
to be accorded greater First Amendment rights than are other speakers.1
And as Justice Kennedy maintained, the fact that media corporations are in the
business of communicating with the public does not distinguish them from
many non-media corporations that also communicate with the public. 1
74
From the structural point of view that the First Amendment antitrust model
necessitates, however, there may be reasons for treating the press differently.
First, as Justice Marshall argued, the press serves an important institutional
role in the marketplace of ideas, and provides "'a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials. "171 Just as recognizing the "New
Corruption" means acknowledging that all speakers need not be treated exactly
alike, so the adoption of a structural First Amendment analysis may justify
taking into account the press's institutional role.'76
Second, the fact that a media corporation's business is speech, not refriger-
ators, may lessen the wealth-distortion concern. At least to a rough extent, the
media corporation's treasury will reflect the popularity of its speech. One
chooses to read the Washington Post, the Washington Times, the Wall Street
Journal, USA Today, or the Daily World at least in part because of the political
content of the newspaper's speech. The media corporation's economic success,
therefore, is more closely related to the public's support for its ideas than, say,
General Motors's success. While this is complicated by, among other things,
the complex relationship a paper has with its audience and its advertisers, there
is arguably at least some correlation. Thus, there might be less cause for
concern about wealth distortion caused by media corporations."
In any event, the fact that media corporations and wealthy individuals also
appear to pose a danger of undue influence does not necessarily mean that the
impulse to respond to the distorting effects of corporate wealth is wrong. It
only reveals how difficult it is in a capitalist society to offset the distorting
effects of unequal private resources on public debate. There may be good
policy reasons for focusing on corporations-as a group they may pose the
the pervasive influence that the media have.
173. 110 S. Ct. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (Frank-
flirter, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged
institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it ....
'[Lliberty of the press is no greater and no less' . .. than the liberty of every citizen of the Republic.");
see also Bellori, 435 U.S. at 798-802 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
174. 110 S. Ct. at 1425 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1402 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)).
176. Cf. BAKER, supra note 16, at 229-34 (arguing that the First Amendment's press clause should
be interpreted as a structural protection for the press).
177. To the extent that the media corporation also has other business interests, this may be less true,
although the statutory exception extends only to the media corporation's regular course of publishing or
broadcasting. A more narrowly tailored rule might require the corporation to separate its media income
from its non-media income for purposes of speech in political campaigns. Moreover, this concern might
be partially met by a requirement that the media disclose its financial ties in the subjects it covers.
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greatest danger of distortion 78-but there is little reason to stop at corporate
spending. Moreover, as the difficulty in distinguishing corporations from other
wealthy economic actors demonstrates, the problem of wealth distorting speech
is so widespread and deeply ingrained that attempts to respond to it will
inevitably run up against competing constitutional interests. But the difficulty
of the task does not mean it should be abandoned; the dangers posed by
concentrated private wealth, reinforced by government rules, cannot be
ignored.
It is precisely the Austin Court's recognition of the dangers posed by
concentrated wealth that most troubled Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice
Scalia directed his harshest criticism at the Court's articulation of a "new"
form of corruption: the systemic distorting effects of wealth. Significantly,
however, neither Justice argued that the "new" definition did not comport with
reality. Rather, both focused their criticism on the implications such a recogni-
tion has for the relationship of government to the marketplace of ideas. Recog-
nition that public debate is tainted by "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth" leads to empowerment of the government
to regulate the debate. 79 And that, Justice Scalia asserted, is "incompatible
with the absolutely central truth of the First Amendment: that government
cannot be trusted to assure, through censorship, the 'fairness' of political
debate. " 180
There are indeed legitimate reasons to be wary of empowering the govern-
ment to ensure a "fair" debate. Caution is especially warranted when the
debate being regulated concerns whether the regulators themselves will remain
in office.181 Money is not the only resource that is unevenly allocated in elec-
toral campaigns. The most important advantage a candidate can have is incum-
bency, and challengers often need to outspend incumbents to offset this advan-
tage. Given the inherent advantages of incumbency, there is a danger that
equalizing monetary resources will favor incumbents and solidify the status
quo.
In addition, as Justice Scalia pointed out, the corporate sector's powerful
private voices may play an important role in checking the powerful public
voice of govetnment; curtailing such voices may therefore have the effect of
"augment[ing] the always dominant power of government. " " In other
words, it may be necessary, to maintain a balance of power between the public
and private spheres, to allow private concentrations of wealth to flourish.
Certainly these factors deserve consideration in reviewing government interven-
178. See supra note 52.
179. 110 S. Ct. at 1411 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
180. Id. at 1408.
181. Id. at 1412, 1415.
182. Id. at 1416.
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tions into the marketplace.
The dissenters' approach, however, would go further and reimpose the
blinders that have hampered First Amendment doctrine from the beginning;
they would prefer a return to the laissez-faire model of First Amendment
jurisprudence. Under that theory, government intervention into the marketplace
of ideas is strictly forbidden, and the danger from the private sphere is accept-
ed as natural-something about which the state can do nothing. Congress has
not taken that attitude toward corporate campaign speech since 1907. While
Justice Kennedy is correct that the Austin majority "impose[d] its own model
of speech" in upholding the restriction at issue," 3 so too would the dissenting
Justices have imposed their own model had they prevailed. Some model must
be imposed. The question is whether the majority's model, which recognizes
the distorting potential of wealth, or the dissenters' model, which would ignore
it altogether, is more "removed from economic and political reality."' The
next section addresses that question.
III. DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM: A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS?
The disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions in Austin
is not a new one; in fact, it uncannily recapitulates a debate that consumed the
Court and the nation from the turn of the century through the New Deal. In
the era marked by Lochner v. New York l'8 and its progeny, the Supreme
Court invalidated approximately 200 statutes designed to offset inequality in
the economic marketplace." The Court repeatedly held that departures from
government "neutrality" toward the market impermissibly interfered with the
liberty of contract protected by the due process clause."8 7 The Court in the
Lochner era, like the Austin dissenters, treated laissez-faire as a constitutional
mandate, and viewed inequalities in the market as natural and beyond govern-
ment control. 8 " Critics of Lochner, like Justice Marshall in Austin, main-
tained that the market was not natural, but was politically constructed by
government rules and regulations, and therefore the government could alter
183. Id. at 1426 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
186. GEOFFREY STONE, ET AL., CONSTITTIONAL LAW 802 (1990).
187. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (invalidating gasoline price
regulation); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating minimum wage law); Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating statute barring employers from requiring employees not to join
union); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45 (invalidating maximum hours law).
188. As the Court stated, "it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract
and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of
fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights." Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17.
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the rules to offset the inequalities that its rules had produced."l 9 Justice
Marshall's recognition in Austin that concentrations of corporate wealth create
inequalities in the political marketplace and justify government intervention can
thus be seen as an extension of the lesson of the Lochner era to the "market-
place of ideas." Justices Scalia and Kennedy would take us back to Lochner.
Seen in this light, Austin appears less revolutionary than inevitable. The
Court merely acknowledged in the campaign speech context what it had long
ago recognized in the economic market: the end of laissez-faire. Congress had
been operating on that premise since 1907, when it first regulated corporate
campaign spending. Thus, on one level Austin is merely a belated judicial
recognition that concentrations of corporate wealth threaten the norms of
equality intrinsic to a full and fair public debate and to democratic government.
Justices Scalia and Kennedy are correct, however, that this recognition has
potentially revolutionary repercussions. It collapses the two central distinctions
that have heretofore guided the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence. Once
"corruption" is understood to encompass the systemic distorting effects of
wealth, expenditures are just as corrupting as contributions and referenda
elections are just as subject to being corrupted as candidate elections. Even the
distinctions relied upon in Austin are undermined by the "New Corruption":
distortion can be caused not only by for-profit corporations, but also by
wealthy individuals, nonprofit corporations, associations, and the media. Thus,
every distinction the Court has erected in the field of campaign finance is
called into question by the Court's belated recognition that economic power
can skew democratic speech.
More fundamentally still, the recognition of the threat posed by private
economic actors to the marketplace of ideas requires a rejection of the
blindered laissez-faire approach to First Amendment doctrine. If First Amend-
ment and democratic values can be undermined not only by government action
but also by private sources of power, the Court, and our elected officials, must
walk a fine line between two substantial dangers. It is no longer enough to
construct a First Amendment "fortress" against government action; we must
at the same time empower government to minimize the threats to speech rights
posed by private concentrations of wealth. The Court has been walking this
line, with great difficulty, throughout its campaign finance decisions. Its only
consistent strategy was the deferential avoidance that characterized its first
seventy years of campaign finance review. 9 ' Once the Court actually began
to address the issue, it began to waver. In retrospect, Buckley foreshadowed
189. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage law on
ground that state may seek to rectify inequalities in bargaining power); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874-75 (1987); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 578-79
(2d ed. 1988).
190. See supra part I.A.
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the Court's subsequent fluctuations; it simultaneously applied both deferential
and exacting scrutiny in a single case, upholding all contribution limits while
striking down all expenditure limits. 91 In Bellotti, the Court adopted an
extremely stringent standard and rejected all claims that government should
be permitted to respond to inequities in private speaking power. 192 The Court
swung back to a deferential stance in NRWC 93 and then returned to stringent
review in NCPAC. '94 Most recently, in MCFL and Austin, the Court has
taken up something of a middle ground, applying strict scrutiny but recognizing
a compelling interest in counteracting the distorting effects of private
wealth.'95 While this wavering approach reflects confusion, it also reflects
the genuine competing concerns that the campaign finance issue presents-the
twin dangers of state censorship and private domination.
The difficulties presented by campaign finance are in some sense inherent
to democratic capitalism. We have a political system premised on equality, but
an economic system based on the promise of inequality. As a constitutional
matter, we guarantee equal protection of the laws, the equal right to vote, and
an equal right to participate in the public debate. These rights are considered
essential to our civic culture; we fought a Civil War over the first two, and
the last is viewed as fundamental to the operation of democratic self-govern-
ment.
At the same time, we also guarantee rights that maintain, encourage, and
reinforce a regime of economic inequality. The rights of property are funda-
mental to our social and economic organization, and the system of "free
enterprise" runs on promises of greater rewards to some than to others. As
the Supreme Court has acknowledged, "wherever the right of private property
exists, there must and will be inequalities of fortune."196 While property
rights are formally equal, in that they protect everyone who owns property,
they are only equal in the sense depicted by Anatole France's critique of
French laws forbidding rich and poor alike from sleeping under bridges. 97
Similarly, the rewards promised by success in the market are formally avail-
able to all, but in reality opportunities are by no means equal. We fought a
Cold War for forty years over these rights of inequality, and now that we have
apparently won that war, we are especially unwilling to give them up. At the
same time, the stark reality of inequality places great strains on our society.
191. See supra part 1.C.1.
192. See supra part 1I.B.1.
193. See supra part I.B.2.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
195. See supra part lI.B.3-4.
196. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915).
197. "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges,
to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE, ch. 7 (1894) quoted in JOHN
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 655 (1980).
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The problem of homelessness has become a national epidemic, and the gaps
between rich and poor, and black and white, remain embarrassingly wide for
a country assertedly committed to equality. 98
When fundamental rights promising equality are overlaid on a background
of economic inequality, also protected by fundamental rights, disjunctures and
contradictions are inevitable. 99 Efforts to achieve equality in such contexts
will often paradoxically require empowering the government to engage in
conduct that appears on the surface to replicate the problem. Just as opponents
of campaign finance regulation see the government as engaging in censorship
when it seeks to respond to the social reality of economic inequality, 21  so
opponents of affirmative action characterize the government's actions as racist
when it seeks to respond to the social reality of racial inequality.2 °' In both
contexts, a policy of absolute government "neutrality," which is on a formalist
view mandated by the Constitution, not only fails to achieve equality but
perpetuates and exacerbates the underlying reality of inequality.2 2
The most curious fact about the campaign finance cases is that they seem
to run against the grain. In virtually every other constitutional context, the
198. In 1984, the richest 20% of the American population earned 42.9% of the nation's total income,
while the richest 5% earned 16.0%. At the same time, the poorest 20% earned only 4.7% of the nation's
income. FRANK LEVY, DOLLARS AND DREAMS: THE CHANGING AMERICAN INCOME DISTRIBUTION 14
(1987). These gaps particularly affect African-Americans. For every dollar a white family holds in assets,
black families hold 9 cents. Jeremiah Cotton, Opening the Gap: The Decline in Black Economic Indicators
in the 1980s, 70 Soc. Sci. Q. 803, 815 (1989). Forty-three percent of black children are born into poverty,
defined by the government as an income less than $12,675 for a family of four. America's Blacks:A World
Apart, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 17. The unemployment rate for African-Americans is more
than twice that for Whites. Id.
199. The campaign finance context is by no means the only legal issue plagued by this conflict; many
of the most controversial and unsettled problems of constitutional doctrine can be attributed at bottom to
the conflict between democratic norms of equality and capitalism's demand for inequality.
The conflict is perhaps most directly posed in the equal protection cases addressing "fundamental
rights." In some of the earlier decisions in this line of cases, the Court held that our commitment to equality
required the state to equalize the playing field by providing the indigent with the means to exercise certain
constitutional rights. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (where a state chooses to provide an appeal
as of right from a criminal conviction, it must provide indigent defendants free trial transcripts); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state must provide indigent defendants free counsel for criminal appeal
as of right). In its more recent decisions, however, the Court has generally held that the state does not
violate a constitutional right by failing to subsidize its exercise, even for those who cannot enjoy the right
without such a subsidy. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (government does not violate constitutional
rights by providing indigent pregnant women with one-sided counseling regarding childbirth while barring
discussion of abortion); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (government does not violate constitutional
rights by subsidizing childbirth but not abortion through Medicaid).
200. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 1419 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("By using distinctions based upon both the speech and the speaker, the Act engages in the
rawest form of censorship: the State censors what a particular segment of the political community might
say with regard to candidates who stand for election.").
201. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3045 n.1, 3046 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (comparing FCC affirmative action policy to South African apartheid laws and Nazi Germany
laws).
202. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There
is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.").
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Court has moved away from notions of substantive equality and denied claims
that the distribution of private resources threatens constitutional values. 203
Why is the Court willing to grant a role for government intervention in this
isolated arena?
One explanation for the Court's unique approach to the campaign spending
cases is that in this context the reality of inequality is too widely acknowledged
to be ignored. As the Court has repeatedly reminded us, the American people
have been suspicious of corporate campaign spending since the turn of the
century. Campaign spending is a regular subject of debate in Congress and the
media, and is revisited by the populace every election. A populist strain in the
American people means that candidates can win votes and sometimes even
elections by running against "big money," so that President Bush feels safe
calling for an end to political action committees. And it is certainly plausible
that the disappointing voter turnouts that have characterized American elections
for so long are in part due to cynicism about the overwhelming power of
moneyed interests.
At the same time that there appears to be widespread agreement that a
problem of inequality exists, there is also a strong normative drive to reduce
inequality in the campaign context. The legitimacy of a democratic state rests
on its elections. The principle that all persons should have an equal right to
vote is central to that legitimacy. It is so central that voting rights is one of
the only areas of civil rights law that has not been gutted by the Rehnquist
Court. It is perhaps for similar reasons that campaign spending regulation is
one of the only areas where the Court has recognized the distorting effects of
private wealth on constitutional rights. A strong strain of equality runs through
our collective vision of the electoral process, and gross disparities in campaign
spending rightly offend that normative vision.
Professor Powe has argued that if we are concerned about the distorting
effects of inequitable wealth distribution on the marketplace of ideas, we
should address the problem at its source, by redistributing wealth.2 4 He
maintains that other means of addressing the problem are less satisfactory from
a First Amendment perspective because they almost inevitably empower the
government to take action addressed to speech itself, which is a dangerous
proposition. But there is little or no political support for the kind of redistribu-
tion that might make a difference, as the public's reaction to the mere mention
of taxes suggests. Must we give up on the values of equality implicitly or
explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution because the majority lacks the political
will to redistribute wealth? The very coexistence of rights of equality and
rights of inequality in the Constitution suggests that it is not an all-or-nothing
203. See supra notes 13, 199.
204. L. A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 243, 282-
83.
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proposition. And it is certainly far less intrusive to limit the advantages people
and institutions can gain through their wealth in certain spheres-e.g., cam-
paign speech-than it would be to redistribute wealth altogether.
IV. CONCLUSION
In one sense, Justice Scalia's focus on metaphor in Austin2 5 was abso-
lutely right; the difference between the majority and the dissent can best be
characterized as a battle of economic metaphors. Both opinions rest metaphor-
ically on the marketplace of ideas, but their visions of the government's role
in that marketplace could not be more different. Justice Scalia's First Amend-
ment metaphor is laissez-faire. In this view, government intervention is the evil
to be feared, especially where, as in the campaign context, the speech at issue
is political and concerns the question of representation. From this essentially
libertarian perspective, freedom of speech is synonymous with the absence of
government regulation. This model is not without support in the case law. First
Amendment doctrine was built on a libertarian frame, and the Court has
constructed some fairly effective bulwarks against government proscriptions
on political speech.2' Moreover, this view is grounded on a basic First
Amendment principle: government regulation of political speech poses a grave
threat to a free and democratic society.
The weakness of Justice Scalia's laissez-faire model is that it ignores the
second and potentially equally grave threat to a free and democratic society:
domination of the political marketplace of ideas by vast concentrations of
wealth. The metaphor in the Austin majority that Justice Scalia denounces-the
"New Corruption"-recognizes that problem. A better metaphor for the
majority's approach, one that captures the institutional consequences of the
"New Corruption," is First Amendment antitrust. The Court's acknowledgment
of the problem of economic domination empowers the government to take an
interventionist role, in the words of Justice Frankfurter, to "purge national
politics of. . . the pernicious influence of 'big money' . . . ."27 This vision
is less libertarian and individualistic than Justice Scalia's, but it may in fact
be more true to the First Amendment's traditional guiding metaphor of the
"marketplace of ideas." First Amendment antitrust adopts the structural and
egalitarian vantage point that the "marketplace" image at its best connotes, 20 8
and embraces government regulation as consistent with the First Amendment
where the regulation is designed to counteract the effects of economic inequali-
205. 110 S. Ct. at 1411 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
207. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. at 572.
208. See supra part I.A.
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ty in that market.
Austin shows the Court relinquishing its hold on the laissez-faire model of
free speech, a model that protects against government interference but fails to
account for the substantial interference caused by private sources of wealth and
power. Austin confirms that, far from being "wholly foreign"2 9 to the First
Amendment, the concept that the government might restrict the speech rights
of some in order to enhance the relative speech rights of others is sometimes
necessary to a meaningful First Amendment guarantee. If Austin is extended
beyond the corporate context, it suggests that the First Amendment should not
be a bar to legislative efforts to reduce inequities in campaign speech opportu-
nities, be they expenditures or contributions, in candidate elections or referen-
da.
But even this-the Austin revolution-may not be sufficient. The political
branches to which we turn for initiative in righting the First Amendment skew
of big money are themselves products-or at least survivors-of the skewed
system. Political action committees, whose substantial donations strongly favor
incumbents,2' lobby most vigorously against regulating campaign spend-
ing,2 ' and campaign finance reform legislation is notoriously difficult to
212enact.
Perhaps an affirmative First Amendment mandate is needed after all, much
like the mandate hinted at in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. It would require
government to ensure that the political marketplace not be overrun by concen-
trations of wealth. The mandate might be satisfied by any number of adminis-
trative regimes, since as we have seen, the issue necessarily presents compet-
ing First Amendment concerns and values. Where it is demonstrated that
concentrated sources of wealth have unduly influenced the marketplace of
ideas, the Court might mandate that some steps toward equalization be taken,
and then oversee the steps that are taken to insure that they do not favor
incumbents. A broader and more equitable system of public financing, subsi-
dized television and radio advertising, and more balanced limits on contri-
butions and expenditures, could all move the system a step closer to equality.
The problem, of course, is in defining when the marketplace is "overrun,"
"distorted," or "unduly influenced," or conversely, when it is "closer to
equality." These definitions are inherently value-based, and will depend on the
209. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
210. See MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 6, at 81-83; LARRY SABATO, PAC POWER: INSIDE THE
WORLD OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMrrrEES 73-78 (1984).
211. See, e.g., DREW, supra note 6, at 33; Public Financing of Congressional Elections: Hearings
Before the House Comm on House Admin., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (March 15-27, 1979) (Rep. Abner
Mikva, D-Ill., predicting that, "[als the special interest Political Action Committees become more en-
trenched, they will become an insurmountable lobby against campaign finance reform.").
212. See MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 6, at 20-26 (detailing some of the reasons why campaign
finance reform initiatives often fail).
Yale Law & Policy Review
respective constitutional emphases we place on equality and inequality. But if
this is a constitutional mandate, and if the problem is a distorted political
process, its resolution cannot be left entirely to that political process.
There is of course no chance that today's Supreme Court would recognize
such an affirmative First Amendment obligation to redress the effects of
economic inequality. The implementation problems would likely dwarf those
the Court continues to face from its desegregation decree in Brown v. Board
of Education some thirty-seven years ago. But at this point, perhaps such an
affirmative judicial role is not required. Notwithstanding all the reasons for
distrusting the political process, Congress and the state legislatures continue
to attempt to reform the campaign finance scheme. At a minimum, the Court
must not close its eyes to the problem it has now acknowledged. As it does
in the broadcast media context, the Court should permit government to engage
in good-faith, narrowly-tailored efforts to respond to the distorting effects of
wealth on the political marketplace of ideas, so long as those legislative efforts
do not appear to have the purpose or effect of protecting incumbents. 2"3 The
standard set forth in Austin-strict scrutiny with the recognition of a compelling
interest in counteracting the distortion of wealth-serves this end by ensuring
careful, but not fatal, scrutiny. Unlike prior standards, it pays attention to both
sides of the problem.
The alternative is a retreat to a libertarian laissez-faire approach. Such a
retreat would not be surprising, given the Court's direction on other issues of
economic inequality and constitutional rights. But it would be unjustifiable. The
problem of wealth distortion has been acknowledged and cannot again be swept
under the rug by a metaphor founded on an eighteenth century vision that does
not comport with reality. Justice Scalia's concern that the First Amendment
not be "brought down . . . by poetic metaphor "214 counsels for updating the
metaphor precisely as the Austin majority has, by acknowledging the legitimacy
of a First Amendment antitrust role to preserve the marketplace of ideas.
213. Of course, as the Court has done in the broadcast context, it is quite possible that the Court will
restrict Austin to its particular context-corporate campaign speech-and continue to strike down efforts
to effect similar changes outside that limited context. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (upholding right of reply and fairness doctrine as applied to broadcasters) with Miami Herald
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down right of reply statute as applied to newspaper).
214. 110 S. Ct. at 1411 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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